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Abstract
The potential benefits of shared eHealth records sys-
tems are promising for the future of improved health-
care. However, the uptake of such systems is hindered
by concerns over the security and privacy of patient
information. The use of Information Accountability
and so called Accountable-eHealth (AeH) systems has
been proposed to balance the privacy concerns of pa-
tients with the information needs of healthcare pro-
fessionals. However, a number of challenges remain
before AeH systems can become a reality. Among
these is the need to protect the information stored
in the usage policies and provenance logs used by
AeH systems to define appropriate use of informa-
tion and hold users accountable for their actions. In
this paper, we discuss the privacy and security issues
surrounding these accountability mechanisms, define
valid access to the information they contain, discuss
solutions to protect them, and verify and model an
implementation of the access requirements as part of
an Information Accountability Framework.
Keywords: Information Accountability; electronic
health records; eHealth; privacy; information security
1 Introduction
Shared eHealth records (SEHR) have the potential
to improve healthcare by allowing a high availabil-
ity of information at the point of care while lowering
costs of maintaining local eHealth records (EHR) sys-
tems by healthcare professionals (HCPs) (Hill & Pow-
ell 2009, Yaffee 2011). However, despite this potential
the uptake of such systems, like Australia’s Person-
ally Controlled Electronic Health Record (PCEHR)
system, has been slow. Some of the major imped-
iments to the wide adoption of eHealth systems are
patient concerns over the security and privacy of their
information (Chen et al. 2010, Croll 2011, Rodrigues
et al. 2013) and HCP dissatisfaction with the systems
(Buntin et al. 2011). Privacy in this context refers to
the claim of individuals to determine when, how, and
to what extent their information is used or disclosed
(Westin 1967).
There are currently conflicting requirements be-
tween HCPs and consumers (i.e. patients). HCPs
desire easy access to as much medical information as
possible to make well-informed decisions, while pa-
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tients want greater control over who can access their
information and how it is used. This conflict is evi-
dent in the recent review of the PCEHR system by the
Department of Health (Department of Health 2014).
For systems like the PCEHR to reap the full bene-
fits that such a shared EHR system can offer, an ap-
propriate balance between the requirements of HCPs
and patients must be met. In the current patient con-
trolled model, HCPs are unable to rely on a SEHR
as a complete source of information on a patient they
are treating, and as a result, HCPs might be discour-
aged from using such systems (Liaw & Hannan 2010,
Garrety & van Teeseling 2012).
To balance these competing requirements, the use
of information accountability (IA), and specifically
an Information Accountability Framework (IAF), in
eHealth systems has been proposed (Gajanayake et al.
2012). These so called Accountable-eHealth (AeH)
systems create an eHealth environment where health
information is available to the right person at the
right time without rigid barriers whilst empowering
the consumers with information control and trans-
parency, thus, enabling the creation of shared eHealth
records that can be useful to both patients and HCPs.
However, AeH systems have yet to be implemented
and a number of technical challenges must be inves-
tigated before they can become a reality.
Two key components of the IAF are the patient us-
age policies and provenance log mechanisms. Usage
policies provide the rules that the framework uses to
determine appropriate use of information, and prove-
nance logs are the key to holding users accountable for
their actions in the system. While previous work on
the IAF has addressed the use and representation of
these mechanisms, the security and privacy implica-
tions of these accountability mechanisms themselves
must also be considered. Both usage policies and
provenance logs will often themselves contain infor-
mation that could be considered sensitive. For this
reason, these must be properly secured from unau-
thorised access. Additionally, for provenance logs to
serve the purpose of holding someone accountable, it
must be possible to prove they have not been tam-
pered with.
In this paper, we explore the privacy and secu-
rity issues surrounding usage policies and provenance
logs in an IAF for use in eHealth systems. We begin
in Section 2 with an explanation of information ac-
countability and the IAF, the architecture of a proto-
type AeH system, and usage policies and provenance
logs. In Section 3, the security and privacy issues
and requirements of usage policies and provenance
logs are defined and discussed along with recommen-
dations and potential solutions. Section 4 covers the
implementation and modelling of the defined access
requirements in a prototype of the IAF. In Section 5,
related work is discussed, and Section 6 concludes the
paper with a discussion of future work.
2 Information Accountability Framework
2.1 Information Accountability
Information Accountability is a concept that involves
using policies and mechanisms to enforce appropri-
ate use through after-the-fact accountability for inten-
tional misuse. IA mechanisms augment, but do not
replace, traditional preventative measures that expect
a user to be authorised to take an action in a system
before attempting to do so. Misuse refers to the unau-
thorised access, use, modification, or disclosure of in-
formation, or other use of information that is not for
the purpose for which the information was provided
(Privacy Act 1988 Clth, Health Identifiers Act 2010
Clth). The presence of IA mechanisms is intended to
act as a deterrent for such misuse (Feigenbaum et al.
2011).
Two key parts of access control are authentica-
tion and authorisation. Authentication is the process
of a user of the system verifying a claimed identity,
for example using a password, key, etc., and autho-
risation refers to what users are allowed to do in a
system (Stamp 2011). In this work on accountability
mechanisms, we make an assumption that a user has
successfully verified they are who they say they are
through an appropriate authentication mechanism.
We’re interested in holding authenticated users ac-
countable for their actions within the system.
2.2 Framework model and architecture
In the IAF that was devised for use in eHealth sys-
tems, four types of users are modelled that will be
considered in this paper: data owners (i.e patients),
data users (i.e healthcare professionals) using health
information for legitimate purposes, data users who
misuse health information, and a central health au-
thority (HA) (i.e. a government agency). In the
IAF, patients set information usage policies on their
healthcare professionals, as opposed to assigning us-
age policies to assets (Grunwell et al. 2013). They
are able to grant or limit access to their health infor-
mation with a HA in place to guarantee that HCPs
always have the access they need to provide appro-
priate care without hindering the patient’s privacy.
Transaction logs of all activities on the system are
kept so that information users can be held account-
able. The entries in the logs contain information on
whether the information access was policy-compliant,
the date and time of the action, which HCP per-
formed the action, and the context of the action (i.e.
whether it occurred during a patient visit, emergency,
consultation, etc.) (Grunwell et al. 2014). However,
as opposed to just providing audit logs of informa-
tion access, an AeH system using the IAF actively
monitors all actions taken in the system for potential
breaches of policy and provides notifications to both
the patient and the relevant HA, as well as provid-
ing patients with a user-friendly way to interact with
these logs.
If possible misuse of a patient’s health informa-
tion is detected by the system, the patient is able to
lodge an inquiry asking for the HCP to justify their
actions. The HCP must then provide an explanation
that justifies their need to access the relevant infor-
mation. The system then uses a semantic reasoner
with appropriate rules defined by a HA along with
the context of the information access, usage policies,
Figure 1: AeH prototype architecture (Grunwell et al.
2013)
and the HCP’s justification to determine whether mis-
use occurred and further investigation is required. If
the system determines the justification provided by
the HCP is not a valid reason to breach the patient’s
information usage policy, the HCP can be held ac-
countable for the ramifications of their actions.
A prototype of the IAF in an AeH system has been
developed as a sample Web-based electronic health
record system (Grunwell et al. 2014). The system
provides patients with the ability to set access policies
on their HCPs, review access logs for their EHR in-
formation, submit inquiries for potential misuse, and
review responses from HCPs. It provides HCPs with
the ability to access their patient’s EHR information,
and respond to inquiries into potential misuse from
their patient to justify their actions. Various case
scenarios were devised to demonstrate and validate
the functionality of this prototype AeH system.
The architecture of the prototype system and the
process flow between users and services is shown in
Figure 1. The major components of the prototype
are the policy aggregation service, access control ser-
vice, transaction logs, and the semantic policy rea-
soner (Grunwell et al. 2014).
2.3 Usage policies
One of the technical challenges when implementing
AeH systems is representing and manipulating us-
age policies (Gajanayake 2013). As a solution to
this problem, in the IAF we adopted an Open Stan-
dard Digital Rights Management (DRM) technol-
ogy, specifically the Open Digital Rights Language
(ODRL) (ODRL Initiative 2012), to represent infor-
mation usage policies. Other similar policy languages
include the Extensible Access Control Markup Lan-
guage (XAML) and Enterprise Privacy Authorization
Language (EPAL). ODRL was chosen as the policy
language because it is independent of implementation
constraints and is capable of expressing a wide range
of policy-based information.
Figure 2 shows an example policy for a sexual
health specialist’s access to a patient’s record that
gives them access to the patient’s EHR while restrict-
ing their access to the patient’s mental health history.
Figure 2: An example access policy represented in
ODRL (Grunwell et al. 2014)
Figure 3: A transaction log entry represented in
ODRL (Grunwell et al. 2014)
Patient policies are aggregated with usage policies set
by the HA. Conflicts between the HA and patient
policies, where the patient tried to restrict access to
information the HCP requires to provide appropriate
care, are kept track of in the resulting amalgamated
policy. By doing so, the system can provide a warn-
ing to HCPs accessing information that the patient
prefers they did not view, allowing them to take ex-
tra care to inform their patient of why they require
access to that information. Likewise, it must be made
explicitly clear to the patient that the HCP will still
be able to access information they tried to restrict.
2.4 Provenance logs
One of the key components of accountable systems are
policy-aware transaction logs (Weitzner et al. 2008).
These logs provide provenance of the data in the sys-
tem. Provenance refers to the causal relationship be-
tween data and events that explains how it came to be
in its current state (Miles et al. 2008). With the pres-
ence of such logs, the provenance of the data can be
compared to usage policies to determine if an action
complied with those policies (Aldeco-Pe´rez & Moreau
2008).
In the IAF and the developed AeH prototype, the
framework logs all information access by HCPs, and
these logs are made available to patients in a user-
friendly format which they can review at any time.
When a HCP makes an invalid access request, the
system notifies the patient of the potential misuse of
their eHealth information.
The information contained in the log entries in-
cludes which HCP accessed the information, the date
and time of the event, the purpose or context of the in-
formation (i.e. patient visit, consultation, etc.), and
whether the access to that information was policy-
compliant. When viewing log entries for access events
that have been determined to be potential misuse,
patients are given options to either mark the access
request as OK if they are satisfied the HCP was not
misusing their information, or submit an inquiry re-
questing the HCP justify their actions.
Figure 3 depicts an ODRL representation of a log
entry. Each log entry captures the usage policy as it
was at the time of the information access event. This
is important in order to provide the system’s reasoner
and the patient with appropriate context for deciding
whether misuse may have occurred.
3 Security and privacy requirements of poli-
cies and logs
In this section we define the information available in
the usage policies and provenance logs, risks associ-
ated with this information, valid access to this infor-
mation, and issues and challenges of securing them.
3.1 Information contained in usage policies
and audit logs
Table 1 lists the information available in the usage
policies and audit logs. As provenance logs capture
the current state of the usage policy at the time of
the event, they contain all the information contained
in the usage policy in addition to details of the event.
A patient’s health record contains sensitive in-
formation, the disclosure of which can cause signif-
icant repercussions to the patient (Appari & Johnson
2010). Patients may consider some of their health
information to be more sensitive such as their men-
tal health history or sexual health history. The in-
formation in the usage policies may reveal some de-
tails about such sensitive information, which could
be damaging to a patient if made public. If disclosed
they can reveal which HCPs the patient sees for treat-
ment, the types of treatment the patient is currently
receiving or has received in the past, and the types
of data available in the patient’s health record. Re-
vealing that a patient is seeking treatment from a
mental health specialist, for example, may be a sig-
nificant concern for some patients and in some situa-
tions could potentially cause socioeconomic issues for
them.
The main risks associated with the usage policies
and provenance log information in the IAF surrounds
unauthorised access to the information they contain,
unauthorised modification of usage policies, tamper-
ing with provenance logs, and the possibility of infor-
mation users to deny they performed an action in the
system after-the-fact.
Weak authentication on the part of a patient or
HCP (i.e. weak/leaked password, leaving a logged in
session unattended, etc.) could lead to the unautho-
rised access of some of the information they contain,
which is why strong authentication mechanisms and
training of users is essential, but is currently out of
the scope of this work.
Table 1: Usage policy and provenance log information
Information type Usage Policy Provenance log
Patient identifier X X
HCPs patient has sought treatment from X X
Health area of HCPs X X
Health area of data accessed - X
Time of information access - X
Location of information access - X
Purpose of information access - X
3.2 Valid access to usage policies
Within an AeH system, a patient’s usage policies can
only be viewed or modified by a limited number of
users in specific situations. Breaking up users into
patients, HCPs, and the HA, the following defines
what constitutes valid access to usage policies:
• Patient: The patient should always be able to
view and modify their usage policies. They can
change their usage preferences in these usage
policies at any time.
• Healthcare professional: The HCP should not
be able to modify or view patient usage policies
directly. They will, however, be informed of their
access level to the information they request in a
patient’s record.
• Health Authority: The HA will need to be
able to view the usage policies of a patient for
the purposes of investigating potential misuse de-
tected by the system. They will also need to be
able to verify the integrity of the usage policies
and the history of who has modified them. The
HA will not be able to modify an individual’s us-
age policy, but can set default policies that may
override a patient choice to ensure all necessary
information is available to the relevant HCP in
order to provide adequate care.
3.3 Valid access to provenance logs
In a similar manner to a patient’s usage policies, ac-
cess to view provenance log entries for a patient’s
health record is restricted depending on the type of
user and their relation to the log entry. Once again in
terms of patients, HCPs, and the HA, the following
defines what constitutes valid access to provenance
logs:
• Patient: The patient should always be able to
access the log entries for their health record.
They can review these logs at any time, and
submit inquiries for events identified as potential
misuse.
• Healthcare professional: The HCP should be
able to access specific log entries for their patients
regarding their own access to that patient’s data.
The specific entries should be viewable to them
when they receive an inquiry requesting that they
justify why they needed to access the relevant
information in the given situation.
• Health Authority: The HA will need to be
able to access the logs of any patient for the pur-
poses of investigating potential misuse detected
by the system. They will also need to be able to
verify the integrity of the log entries and usage
policies.
It is important to state that no user should be
able to modify the existing contents of the log entries
under any circumstances.
3.4 Non-repudiation
Due to the central role provenance logs play in ac-
countable systems, it is crucial that they are cor-
rect and not alterable (Snodgrass et al. 2004). In
such systems, it must be possible to detect if the logs
have been tampered with in order to provide non-
repudiable evidence of all actions (Haeberlen et al.
2007). Additionally, as previously stated, the prove-
nance information in these logs can itself contain sen-
sitive information that must be protected (Davidson
et al. 2011).
In a similar way, usage policies must only be al-
terable by the patient or an approved delegate, and
it must be possible to prove they have not been tam-
pered with. Tampering with a usage policy could re-
sult in unauthorised access to a patient record that
would be seen as valid by the system and would be
included in the provenance logs. Appropriate meth-
ods of securing and ensuring the integrity of these
usage policies in addition to the provenance logs is an
essential part of designing AeH systems.
3.5 Securing usage policies and provenance
logs
There has been a lot of research in the area of prevent-
ing tampering of audit logs through cryptographic
methods (Holt 2006, Snodgrass et al. 2004, Haeberlen
et al. 2007). A key requirement of tamper-proof log-
ging methods is ensuring the forward security of the
logs, that is if an attacker gains control of our system,
all logs captured prior to the compromise cannot be
tampered with and so any attempt to modify or re-
move them can be detected (Yavuz et al. 2012b, Sinha
et al. 2014). It is also important that the selected
method is append only, and the system can detect
deletion of log data.
Secure logging mechanisms often use either sym-
metric primitives or Public Key Cryptography (PKC)
schemes. One way of ensuring the integrity of log
entries with forward security is through the use of
hash chains, where a different key is generated for
each log entry to generate a hash-based message au-
thentication code (HMAC) that is used to verify the
integrity of the entry (Sinha et al. 2014). Yavuz
et al. (2012a) devised a digital signature scheme
called Blind-Aggregate-Forward (BAF) which can ef-
ficiently create publicly verifiable, forward-secure sig-
natures to verify the integrity of audit logs. Like-
wise, the Log Forward-secure and Append-only Signa-
ture (LogFAS) logging scheme enables more efficient
verification of logs as compared to other PKC-based
mechanisms which are often computationally expen-
sive (Yavuz et al. 2012b).
Figure 4: Provenance Log Access Control model
Figure 5: Log data automata model
Similar techniques can be used to ensure the in-
tegrity of patient usage policies with forward security
for each modification of the policy by the patient.
Each modification of a patient usage policy should
also produce a log entry of the event.
It is also important to implement appropriate
backup procedures of logs and policies to prevent
corruption and further ensure their integrity. These
backups must be treated with the same concern for
privacy and security as the main storage of the logs
and policies with the appropriate mechanisms in pace
to protect them (Ko et al. 2011).
4 Prototype Implementation and Modelling
Access to provenance log entries and usage policies
as defined in Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 was imple-
mented in the IAF prototype described in Section 2.2
for verification as part of the AeH system.
The requirements for access to log entries was im-
plemented in the framework prototype. The service
first checks the user for their current role (patient,
HCP, HA representative, etc.), allowing the HA ac-
cess to any log entry in order to fulfil their role. Then,
if the user is not the HA, the user requesting the data
is checked for their relation to the log entry using
the entry’s metadata, checking whether they are the
owner of the log entry (i.e. the patient whose health
record was accessed to create the log event), or in the
case of HCPs if they were the “actor” who took the
action the log entry captures and whether they are
required to justify the action taken.
Likewise, the implementation of the access restric-
tion on usage policies was also added to the system.
The service takes the current user, metadata about
the usage policy, and the action attempted on the
policy (read or write) to determine if the current user
should be allowed to perform the given action on the
usage policy. The owner of the policy will be allowed
to both read and modify it, while the HA will only
be allowed to read it. No other user is permitted to
view the policy.
In addition to implementing the access require-
ments in the prototype, the algorithms devised were
modelled in the IAF protocol using UPPAAL. UP-
PAAL is a model-checker jointly developed by Up-
psala University in Sweden and Aalborg University
in Denmark that enables the verification of real-time
systems that can be modelled as networks of timed
automata (Behrmann et al. 2004). Its main compo-
nents are a system editor for creating models, the
simulator that allows you to simulate the behaviour
of the system, and the verifier which analyses the
model’s behaviour.
A simple model of the algorithm for accessing
provenance logs is depicted in Figures 4 and 5. Using
the verifier on this model, we are able to test the de-
fined access requirements are satisfied. For example,
in order to test that a user is able to view a log entry
for their health record we can use the following query:
E<> (userIsOwner &&
LogAccessControl.LogEntryDisplayed)
This query tests if there is a path through the
model where the log entry is displayed to the owner of
the log entry. The result from the verifier is “Prop-
erty is satisfied”, meaning our requirement is met. To
test the requirement that only the owner, HA, or the
HCP who performed action can view the log entry,
we first verify that there is a path in the model where
a user who is not related to the log entry can receive
an access denied result using the following query:
E<> (!userIsOwner &&
!userIsHA && !userIsActor &&
LogAccessControl.LogEntryAccessDenied)
This results in “Property is satisfied”, which was
the desired outcome. Then to verify that there isn’t a
path through the model that would allow a user who
is not related to the log entry to view it, we use this
query:
E<> (!userIsOwner &&
!userIsHA && !userIsActor &&
LogAccessControl.LogEntryDisplayed)
This query results in “Property is not satisfied”,
verifying that there is no such path in the model and
our requirement is met.
Using this method of testing the model, we were
able to verify that the protocol met the access con-
trol requirements for the provenance logs and usage
policies.
5 Related Work
Due to the sensitive nature of information that can
be contained in eHealth systems, it is essential that
access to that information is appropriately managed.
The security of the stored data, access control and
access monitoring must all be considered when im-
plementing EHR systems (Rodrigues et al. 2013). In
complex domains like eHealth, the traditional pre-
ventive approaches to information access control that
rigidly deny access to users without appropriate per-
missions are not enough by themselves, and as a re-
sult a number of researchers have begun working on
augmenting these preventive measures with account-
ability (Feigenbaum et al. 2011, Weitzner et al. 2008,
Sloan & Warner 2010).
One of the primary causes for patient concerns
with eHealth systems is information dissemination,
and as such it is important that it is transparent
to patients how their information is used and who
it will be disclosed to both now and in the future
(Rahim et al. 2013). Rodrigues et al. (2013) state
that when hosting EHR information, appropriate se-
curity mechanisms must be put in place while making
it transparent to patients how their data is managed.
Transparency is one of the fundamental aspects of In-
formation Accountability (Weitzner et al. 2008).
A number of approaches to implementing IA mech-
anisms have been proposed. Jagadeesan et al. (2009)
attempted to develop a formal foundation for the de-
sign of IA systems using privacy policies to define ap-
propriate use of information, focusing on using audit
logs that can detect potential policy violations and
information misuse. Weitzner et al. (2008) suggested
the use of policies combined with policy-aware trans-
action logs and a policy reasoning capability to enable
systems to hold users of information accountable. Fol-
lowing on from this work, Sloan & Warner (2010) de-
scribed the challenges of implementing accountability
systems, both in terms of social and technical aspects.
These studies generally focus on IA and accountable
systems from a general point of view without consid-
eration for the specific requirements of eHealth sys-
tems. Likewise a study on the security and privacy
implications of the audit logs and policy information
in these mechanisms has not been undertaken.
International standards for the interoperability
of health systems have been developed including
HL7, ISO 27799, CEN 13606 health information, and
ISO/HL7 10781. Health Level 7 (HL7) (HL7 Inter-
national n.d.) is a set of ANSI-accredited standards
developed to enable interoperability to support the
exchange of health-related information across hetero-
geneous systems. The newer HL7 Fast Healthcare
Interoperability Resources (FHIR) standards frame-
work includes specifications for Provenance resources
that describe how the retrieved version of a resource
came to be in its current state (HL7 International
2014a). Additionally, overlapping information from
these provenance resources are included in the Se-
curity Event resources which act as audit logs (HL7
International 2014b).
The IAF model provides additional information in
the provenance logs than in the HL7 specification,
including capturing the state of the usage policy at
the time of the event. Rather than just providing
audit logs, the IAF uses these logs to actively notify
data owners of potential breaches and provides con-
sumers with a user-friendly way to interact with these
logs. While the HL7 Provenance Resource does in-
clude an integrity signature that can be used for lim-
ited non-repudiation, this is focused on the integrity
of a resource received when exchanging information
but does not ensure that stored logs and policies are
not tampered with. Additionally, the security and
privacy implications of these logs are not explored.
This work on security and privacy requirements for
provenance logs could be applied when implementing
the specifications of the HL7 Provenance and Security
Event resources in a system.
6 Conclusion and future work
Accountable-eHealth systems enable the creation of
shared eHealth records that can be useful to both
consumers and HCPs. By ensuring transparency and
accountability is applied, consumers are aware of how
and why their information is accessed, while HCPs are
able to access all the information they need to pro-
vide care to their patients. As a result, Accountable-
eHealth systems create an eHealth environment where
health information is available to the right person at
the right time without rigid barriers whilst empower-
ing the consumers with information control and trans-
parency, thus, enabling a means of reaping the full
benefits from a shared eHealth record.
Usage policies and provenance logs are both es-
sential parts of accountability mechanisms, but in
previous work on Accountable-eHealth systems, the
privacy and security requirements of their use in an
eHealth system had not been explored. In this paper
we have discussed the privacy and security issues sur-
rounding usage policies and provenance logs in an In-
formation Accountability Framework for eHealth sys-
tems. The requirements for valid access to this infor-
mation have been defined, and the implementation
of these requirements has been verified in the proto-
type and through protocol simulation. Additionally,
the risks associated with improper access to this in-
formation has been identified, and possible solutions
to protect this data from both unauthorised viewing
and tampering to ensure non-repudiation have been
discussed.
These requirements and possible solutions can be
used to design more secure AeH systems, and will be
implemented in a more full featured prototype that
will integrate the IAF into an existing EHR system.
This full-featured prototype will be used in studies
to verify the practicality and suitability of the IAF
as a solution to patient privacy concerns and HCP
information access requirements.
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